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A conceptual framework for nonkin food
sharing: timing and currency of benefits
JEFFREY R. STEVENS & IAN C. GILBY
Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior, University of Minnesota
(Received 2 December 2002; initial acceptance 4 March 2003;
final acceptance 24 April 2003; MS. number: ARV-24R)
Many animal species, from arthropods to apes, share food. This paper presents a new framework that
categorizes nonkin food sharing according to two axes: (1) the interval between sharing and receiving the
benefits of sharing, and (2) the currency units in which benefits accrue to the sharer (especially food versus
nonfood). Sharers can obtain immediate benefits from increased foraging efficiency, predation avoidance,
mate provisioning, or manipulative mutualism. Reciprocity, trade, status enhancement and group
augmentation can delay benefits. When benefits are delayed or when food is exchanged for nonfood
benefits, maintaining sharing can become more difficult because animals face discounting and currency
conversion problems. Explanations that involve delayed or nonfood benefits may require specialized
adaptations to account for timing and currency-exchange problems. The immediate, selfish fitness benefits
that a sharer may gain through by-product or manipulative mutualism, however, apply to various food-
sharing situations across many species and may provide a simpler, more general explanation of sharing.
 2004 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Sharing food appears to exemplify the paradox of al-
truism: a recipient gains fitness benefits at the expense of
a donor. Despite this apparent altruism, food sharing com-
monly occurs in nonhuman animals, including insects
(Bolten et al. 1983; Boggs 1995; Vahed 1998), birds
(Heinrich 1988a; Stacey & Koenig 1990; Thiollay 1991;
Evans & Marler 1994), cetaceans (Johnson 1982; Hoelzel
1991), vampire bats, Desmodus rotundus (Wilkinson 1984;
Denault & McFarlane 1995), and other small mammals
(Judd & Sherman 1996; Brotherton et al. 2001). Primates,
in particular, have been well studied (reviewed by Feistner
& McGrew 1989), including prosimians (Gurksy 2000),
New World monkeys (Starin 1978; Ferrari 1987; Feistner &
Price 1990; Perry & Rose 1994; Pastor-Nieto 2001), Old
World monkeys (Kavanagh 1972; Strum 1975, 1981;
Dittus 1984) and apes (Kuroda 1984; de Waal 1989;
Nettelbeck 1998). Many of these and other authors have
used different definitions of food sharing. Here, we adopt
a relatively broad definition of sharing: joint use of
monopolizable food items. That is, if an individual can
defend a food item but allows another individual to
consume part of the item, it is considered to be sharing.
This definition includes both passive (tolerated theft) and
active sharing (facilitated transfer, food recruitment).
Regardless of the method of transfer, the food owner loses
potential fitness benefits by sharing.
Sharing poses an important economic problem in
animal societies. Although apparently altruistic, sharing
typically yields benefits to the food donor either indirectly
through kin selection (Hamilton 1964) or directly through
other mechanisms. Much of animal food sharing probably
results from kin selection or parenteoffspring sharing
(Feistner & McGrew 1989). Because this type of sharing is
well understood, we focus on nonkin explanations of
sharing involving direct fitness benefits to the donor.
Fitness Benefits
Here we review nonkin sharing studies using a concep-
tual framework partially based on Brown’s (1980) fitness
components. We divide fitness benefits for nonkin sharing
along two axes (Table 1). Our first axis considers the time
at which the donor receives its benefit: either immediately
following sharing or after a delay. For example, a lioness,
Panthera leo, that just captured a Thompson’s gazelle,
Gazella thomsonii, has two options when another pride
member approaches: she can defend the carcass or allow
the intruding lioness to feed with her. By sharing, the
owner may benefit immediately by avoiding a contest,
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which could result in the loss of the entire carcass or
injury to the owner. Alternatively, sharing may provide
delayed benefits by increasing the survival of the intrud-
ing female, thereby raising the chances that she remains
in the group. If larger groups of females can better defend
their cubs from infanticidal males, the lioness may reap
future rewards for sharing.
Categorizing types of sharing by the time at which the
fitness benefit accrues (immediate or delayed) provides an
important distinction. Deferring immediately obtainable
benefits until the future has two primary difficulties. First,
delaying benefits trades current fitness for future fitness.
Animals can invest current resources into offspring, but by
delaying benefits, they divert investment into future
offspring. If this delays reproduction, it could reduce
lifetime reproductive success. Second, much can happen
between the time that a food item is shared and the return
benefit accrues. Because of this uncertainty, animals may
discount the value of delayed benefits (Mazur 1987;
Rachlin 2000), thus increasing the perceived value of
immediate benefits. That is, animals may prefer smaller,
immediate benefits to larger, delayed benefits. This pref-
erence may cause animals to devalue food up to 50% in
the first second of delay (Mazur 2000). Discounting plays
an important role in food sharing because food items
are often ephemeral (Stephens & Krebs 1986). Explana-
tions that rely on these delayed benefits may require
complicated mechanisms to overcome the problem of
discounting.
Our second axis considers the fitness currency of the
benefit received by the donor. The donor can either
receive more food as a result of sharing or receive another
type of benefit such as grooming, predation avoidance, or
mating opportunities. In the lion example, the owner that
shares to avoid the contest and possible loss of the carcass
gives up part of her food to consume more food: the
returned benefit currency is the same. Yet, the owner that
shares to maintain a large group size exchanges food for
another currency: increased cub survival.
Classifying fitness effects based on the currency of
the received benefit allows us to consider whether the
food donors must convert between fitness currencies
(the biological market effect: Noe¨ & Hammerstein 1994,
1995; Noe¨ et al. 2001). How does one bite of food convert
into decreasing predation risk, increasing the probability
of mating, reducing harassment costs, lowering parasite
load, acquiring higher rank, or increasing group size? We
do not suggest that animals consciously calculate these
conversions; rather, natural selection favours individuals
that make appropriate conversions. Nevertheless, varia-
tion in amounts of food donated and values of returned
benefits may require flexible, complicated rules to convert
between variable benefits. Some argue that the complexity
of these trading networks drove the evolution of the
human brain (La Cerra & Bingham 1998).
Despite the importance of timing and currency on
fitness, few studies have satisfactorily considered these
aspects in food sharing. We argue that these factors
influence the complexity of hypotheses used to explain
sharing. Therefore, this framework can help us evaluate
which hypotheses provide the most parsimonious ex-
planations of sharing.
IMMEDIATE BENEFITS
Immediate benefits accrue during or directly following the
sharing event. Occasionally, classifying benefits as imme-
diate or delayed proves difficult; some types of benefits
can seem to occur both immediately and after a delay.
Nevertheless, a clear difference often distinguishes be-
tween benefits that accrue during or immediately follow-
ing sharing and those that accrue after a time delay.
Table 1. Summary of hypotheses and examples of food sharing categorized by timing and currency of benefits
Immediate benefits Delayed benefits
Explanation Species Studies Explanation Species Studies
Food for
food
Increased
foraging
Ravens Heinrich 1988a, b,
1989
Reciprocity Vampire bats Wilkinson 1984;
Denault & McFarlane 1995
Hyaenas East & Hofer 1991 Capuchin monkeys de Waal 1997b, 2000
Killer whales Hoelzel 1991;
Guinet et al. 2000
Chimpanzees de Waal 1989;
Mitani & Watts 1999, 2001
Food for
nonfood
benefits
Predation
avoidance
House sparrows Elgar 1986 Trade Vampire bats Wilkinson 1986
Capuchin monkeys Westergaard & Suomi 1997
Chimpanzees de Waal 1989, 1997a;
Koyama & Dunbar 1996
Mate
provisioning
Insects Boggs 1995;
Gwynne 1997;
Vahed 1998
Status
enhancement
Arabian babblers Zahavi 1990
Chimpanzees Stanford 1998 Chimpanzees Boesch & Boesch 1989
Harassment Rhesus monkeys Hauser 1992 Group Scrub-jays Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1978;
Chimpanzees Wrangham 1975;
Goodall 1986
augmentation
Meerkats
Brown 1980, 1987
Clutton-Brock 2002
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Food for Food
Increased foraging efficiency
Although it may appear to be counterintuitive, individ-
uals may actually increase their foraging efficiency by
sharing food with other individuals. This occurs most
often through recruitment calling. In some species, indi-
viduals that have information about the location of food
give specific calls that attract nearby foragers. The callers
do not necessarily possess food but alert others to the
location of food, effectively sharing food.
Richner & Heeb (1995, 1996) proposed the ‘recruitment
centre’ hypothesis as a selfish alternative to Ward &
Zahavi’s (1973) altruistic ‘information centre’ explanation
of communal roosts. Richner & Heeb contended that
recruitment calling actually benefits the caller by imme-
diately increasing its capture rate. Brown et al. (1991)
supported this claim by observing that cliff swallows,
Hirundo pyrrhonota, attract conspecifics with food calls.
Because individuals in a group have higher prey capture
rates than singletons (Brown & Brown 1996), callers may
recruit group members to increase individual foraging
efficiency. Larger group sizes may also lower individual
vigilance for predators (Lima & Dill 1990), thereby
allowing more time for foraging.
In addition to increasing baseline capture rate, recruit-
ing can allow individuals to form groups that displace
food owners, thereby providing access to otherwise inac-
cessible food sources. Probably one of the most celebrated
cases of this is raven, Corvus corax, recruitment calling at
large carcasses. Heinrich and colleagues (Heinrich 1988a, b,
1989; Heinrich & Marzluff 1991, 1995) described situa-
tions in which juvenile ravens give recruitment calls before
feeding at large carcasses. After eliminating recip-
rocal altruism and kin selection as possible explanations
(Heinrich 1988b; Marzluff & Heinrich 1991; Parker et al.
1994), Heinrich and colleagues proposed that by-product
mutualism (West-Eberhard 1975; Brown 1983) probably
explains the sharing. By recruiting other ravens, juveniles
can overwhelm the defences of adult territory holders,
thereby gaining access to the otherwise inaccessible carcass
(Heinrich 1988a, 1989).
By increasing call rate as they approach lions at a kill,
spotted hyaenas, Crocuta crocuta, also appear to recruit
others to take over a carcass (Holekamp et al. 2000). Larger
group sizes allow them to supplant nonclan members as
well as other species such as lions and leopards, Panthera
pardus (East & Hofer 1991). Although lions may not ac-
tively recruit other pride members when defending a
carcass from hyaenas (C. Packer, personal communica-
tion), sharing with pride members may allow them to
defend their kill more effectively, thereby reducing their
chances of losing the entire kill (Cooper 1991).
Killer whales, Orcinus orca, may increase their foraging
efficiency by sharing the carcasses of pinnipeds and other
cetaceans (Hoelzel 1991; Guinet et al. 2000). Guinet et al.
(2000) hypothesized that they may share to maintain
buoyancy of large carcasses. If a single killer whale feeds
solitarily, the carcass may quickly sink in deep water. By
sharing, multiple whales can keep the carcass afloat,
allowing individual foragers to consume more.
Food for Nonfood Benefits
Predation avoidance
In addition to increasing capture rate, recruitment
calling may yield immediate benefits in a currency other
than food, such as reduced predation risk. By recruiting
others, an individual feeds in a group rather than soli-
tarily, potentially diluting predation risk, increasing pred-
ator detection, and confusing predators (Lima & Dill 1990;
Krause & Ruxton 2002). Elgar (1986) found that house
sparrows, Passer domesticus, give more recruitment calls in
the presence of divisible food; however, call rate decreases
dramatically as flock size increases. This suggests that the
birds may recruit others to dilute their own predation risk
only when food is shareable and risk is high for solitary
foragers.
Models of sharing under predation risk predict that
sharing/recruiting can immediately benefit individuals
through predation avoidance. Newman & Caraco (1989)
modelled recruitment calling situations in which risk of
starvation and group predation risk vary. Recruiting is
evolutionarily stable when predation risk decreases with
group size; therefore, calling benefits solitary individuals
by increasing group size and diluting risk. In another set
of models, provisioning unrelated offspring at a nearby
nest quiets begging calls, thereby reducing the chance of
attracting predators. By sharing with unrelated offspring,
an individual may decrease predation risk for its own
young (Caraco & Brown 1986; Giraldeau & Caraco 2000).
Mate provisioning
In many species of insects, birds and mammals, males
acquire and donate food to females either before, during,
or after copulation (termed mate provisioning, courtship
feeding, nuptial gift giving, or meat-for-sex). Males may
relinquish body parts, produce glandular secretions, or
share prey or other food to gain fitness benefits via natural
and sexual selection (reviewed in Lack 1940; Thornhill
1976; Boggs 1995; Gwynne 1997; Vahed 1998).
Naturally selected fitness benefits of mate provisioning
act primarily on survival. In several insect species, females
cannibalize males during or after copulation. Provisioning
the female may distract her from cannibalizing the male,
thereby increasing his probability of survival and facili-
tating the transfer of sperm (Gwynne 1997). Provisioning
may also offer paternal investment by providing nutri-
tional support for the female. Providing food has a direct
effect on female fecundity in many species of insects and
birds by increasing egg number, egg size and offspring
weight (Nisbet 1973; Newton 1979; Gwynne 1982; Lifjeld
& Slagsvold 1986; Moore et al. 2000).
Sexual selection may also maintain mate provisioning
via sperm competition and female choice. Males of many
insect species donate an edible gelatinous mass (sperma-
tophylax) in addition to a sperm sac during mating.
Sakaluk (1984) suggested that provisioning female crick-
ets, Gryllodes supplicans, allows enough time for the
ejaculate to transfer out of the sperm sac before she can
feed on the sperm. Other researchers propose that the
spermatophylax may prevent future mating by releasing
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refractory chemicals, plugging or filling the reproductive
tract, or releasing chemicals that render foreign sperm
inviable (Gwynne 1986). Probably the most common
explanation of mate provisioning is mate attraction. Males
share food with females to entice them to mate, and
sharing may signal the male’s fitness and paternal in-
vestment. Feeding females often increases copulation rate
(Tasker & Mills 1981; Vahed 1998; Mougeot 2000;
Gonza´lez-Solı´s et al. 2001) and mate retention (Tasker &
Mills 1981) in insects and birds.
In chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, males capture monkeys
and may give meat to females, possibly in exchange for
mating access (meat-for-sex hypothesis). A male chim-
panzee may occasionally withhold meat from a sexually
receptive female until he has mated with her, and only
then allow her to obtain a portion (Goodall 1986; Stanford
1998). Sexually receptive females may receive more meat
from males than expected by chance (Teleki 1973, 1981).
Stanford and others (Stanford et al. 1994; Stanford 1998)
interpreted this as evidence that males trade meat for
mating. However, Goodall (1986) and Teleki (1973, 1981)
demonstrated that sexually receptive females are more
persistent in their efforts to obtain meat (i.e. high
harassment), possibly explaining their increased success.
Kuroda (1984) showed that female bonobos, Pan paniscus,
obtain more food from males if they first copulate with
them.
Other studies of chimpanzees have failed to find a
relationship between food and mating, instead finding
no preferences for sexually receptive females (I. C. Gilby,
unpublished data) or, more importantly, no effect of
sharing on male reproductive success (Hemelrijk et al.
1992, 1999; Mitani & Watts 2001). Rather than sharing in
return for an immediate copulation, a male chimpanzee
may share to establish an affiliative relationship with a
female, increasing the chances of mating later. In the
chimpanzees at Gombe National Park, Tanzania, a male’s
frequency of involvement in consortships (exclusive
mating relationships) positively correlates with the fre-
quency with which he shares food with females (Tutin
1979). However, it remains unknown whether sharing
with a particular female increases the chances of consort-
ing with that female. This possibility of future rewards
suggests that mate provisioning can provide both imme-
diate and delayed benefits.
Harassment and manipulative mutualism
Sharing may occur because begging reduces the fitness
of the owner. Owners benefit by sharing part of the food
with the beggar to avoid injury and energetic or oppor-
tunity costs. Blurton Jones (1984, 1986, 1987) proposed
the ‘tolerated theft’ hypothesis for sharing, contending
that if the fitness benefit of consuming a packet of food
follows a diminishing returns function, later bites of food
provide less fitness benefit than earlier bites. Therefore, if
a hungry beggar encounters a partially satiated owner, an
asymmetry in hunger level exists. Parker’s (1974) model
predicted that individuals that gain more from a resource
should fight more vigorously, forcing the partially satiated
owner to acquiesce and share with the beggar. Other
theoretical (Winterhalder 1996b) and observational
(Kuroda 1984; Goodall 1986; Perry & Rose 1994) studies
support the effect of satiation on sharing. However, an
empirical study manipulating satiation level of the beggar
found no increase in begging or sharing with hungry
beggars (Nissen & Crawford 1936).
Blurton Jones’ model only considered what happens
in the presence of an asymmetry in satiation between the
players. The tolerated theft model does not explain shar-
ing that occurs when both players are equally hungry.
Harassment can influence sharing in the presence or
absence of a satiation asymmetry. Wrangham (1975) first
emphasized the importance of harassment (or ‘sharing
under pressure’) when studying the Gombe chimpanzees.
He suggested that a food possessor ‘may use the parts that
he does not need to reduce the costs of possession by
‘‘paying’’ other individuals to go away’ (page 4.57). Moore
(1984) proposed that this threat of attack from a beggar
may be very costly for an owner and offered a graphical
model of how costs of harassment (both physical and
social) can influence sharing. Stevens & Stephens (2002)
used game theory to formalize the first mathematical
model of the effects of harassment on sharing. They pre-
dicted that the defensibility of a food source may influence
harassment by beggars; if beggars can obtain scraps,
harassment may be worthwhile; if beggars harass intensely
enough, theymay inflict such costs on owners that sharing
becomes the best strategy (manipulative mutualism).
To demonstrate the viability of harassment as an ex-
planation of food sharing, two predictions must hold: (1)
harassment must be costly to the owner and (2) increasing
harassment should increase the probability of the beggar
accessing food. Harassment can include extending a hand
towards an owner, vocalizing, slapping the ground, grab-
bing at food, or attacking the owner (Nissen & Crawford
1936; Schessler & Nash 1977; Goodall 1986; Perry & Rose
1994; Westergaard et al. 1998), possibly injuring the
owner or forcing the owner to expend energy by re-
taliating or moving away (Wrangham 1975; Fragaszy &
Mason 1983; Goodall 1986). Harassment may also impose
opportunity costs associated with a reduced intake rate
and the potential to lose all of the resource to the beggars.
Hauser (1992) revealed that rhesus macaques, Macaca
mulatta, that give recruitment calls experience less ag-
gression and consume more food than those that do not
recruit. Therefore, the harassment associated with not
recruiting is more costly (in terms of food consumed) than
the food shared after recruiting.
For food sharing to occur, the costs of harassment to the
owner must outweigh the potential benefit lost by sharing
(Stevens & Stephens 2002); therefore, more intense harass-
ment should elicit more sharing. Many observational
studies suggest that begging more intensely increases
sharing (Nissen & Crawford 1936; Teleki 1973; Wrangham
1975; Kuroda 1984; Takahata et al. 1984; Boesch & Boesch
1989; I. C. Gilby, unpublished data) and more beggars
elicit more sharing (Fruth & Hohmann 2002). In addition,
an empirical study indicates that squirrel monkey, Saimiri
boliviensis, and chimpanzee food owners share four times
more often with individuals that harass than with those
that do not harass (Stevens 2004).
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DELAYED BENEFITS
Animals may recoup the benefits of sharing following the
sharing event. This benefit can accrue after several seconds
or potentially after several months. The amount of time
between sharing and recouping the benefit plays an im-
portant role in the evolution of sharing, especially in
short-lived animals. The bias towards primates presented
here reflects the status of the literature for delayed-benefit
hypotheses of sharing.
Food for Food
Reciprocity
One of the more popular explanations of food sharing is
reciprocal altruism (or reciprocity), which states that an
animal may perform a costly act that benefits another if
the recipient returns the favour later (Trivers 1971). Com-
puter models suggest that reciprocity is evolutionarily
stable (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), but it proves challeng-
ing to test directly, chiefly because of the difficulty in
measuring the costs and benefits to fitness (Seyfarth &
Cheney 1988). Relatively few studies test reciprocal al-
truism in a food-sharing context, and most fail to establish
its importance in sharing. Some demonstrate a reciprocal
sharing pattern, but do not consider that such patterns
can emerge as by-products of other mechanisms. For in-
stance, if two individuals demonstrate symmetrical at-
traction or aversion to each other, and such positive or
negative association affects food-sharing behaviour, then
a reciprocal distribution of sharing will result, even
though reciprocal altruism does not explain why they
share food (de Waal & Luttrell 1988; de Waal 2000;
Brosnan& deWaal 2002). As an example, consider a pair of
unrelated male chimpanzees that are inseparable. When
potential food-sharing situations arise, both members of
the pair tend to share because the other harasses. Because
these two individuals spend more time with each other
than with other individuals, their mutualistic sharing
will appear reciprocal. This ‘symmetry-based’ reciprocity
may explain food sharing in wild chimpanzees (Mitani &
Watts 1999, 2001; Watts & Mitani 2002), vampire bats
(Wilkinson 1984; Denault & McFarlane 1995) and captive
tufted capuchins, Cebus apella (de Waal et al. 1993; de
Waal 1997b). Although symmetry-based reciprocity im-
plies reciprocal sharing, it does not necessarily involve
precise accounting of costs and benefits required in
traditional or ‘calculated’ reciprocity.
Other examples of reciprocal sharing adjust for symme-
try-based reciprocity. For instance, in one study, captive
chimpanzees showed a reciprocal sharing pattern, even
after statistically adjusting for association patterns (de
Waal 1989). Nevertheless, this correlational study identi-
fied long-term reciprocal relationships (over all trials, A
tended to share with B and vice versa), but did not
manipulate ownership and assess the effects of sharing in
the next trial. In an experiment with captive capuchins,
de Waal (2000) found that if individual A shared
frequently with individual B in one particular trial, then
B tended to share frequently with A in the next trial. de
Waal concluded that the events of the first stage ‘set the
tone’ for the second; if A was nice, then B would be nice
too. Unlike traditional reciprocity, such ‘attitudinal reci-
procity’ does not require ‘strict contingency between
given and received services’ and therefore proves less
cognitively demanding (de Waal 2000, page 260). The
general relevance of attitudinal reciprocity remains un-
clear. No studies have convincingly documented calcu-
lated reciprocity.
Negative reciprocity. Another variation on reciprocal al-
truism is ‘negative reciprocity’ or punishment. In this
case, an animal punishes by inflicting a fitness cost on a
defecting (noncooperative) opponent, discouraging future
defection (Boyd & Richerson 1992; Clutton-Brock &
Parker 1995a). Punishment differs from harassment be-
cause punishment involves delayed rather than immedi-
ate benefits. Benefits accrue in future interactions when
opponents learn the contingencies of punishment and
switch to cooperation. Although common in contexts
such as mate guarding (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995b),
the effect of aggression on future food sharing is not well
studied in nonhuman animals.
Food for Nonfood Benefits
Trade
Strict reciprocal altruism, as discussed above, assumes
that reciprocation occurs in the same fitness currency as
the original act. The trade hypothesis also assumes recip-
rocal exchange, but reciprocation occurs in a different
currency (Noe¨ & Hammerstein 1994, 1995; Noe¨ et al.
2001). For example, players may exchange food for social
favours such as grooming or support in a dominance
conflict. As with reciprocity, this concept proves challeng-
ing to test directly because of the difficulty in measuring
the relative fitness value of different currencies. Is groom-
ing actually costly to perform? However, a few studies
indicate that trade may elicit food-sharing behaviour for
some species.
Blood sharing among vampire bats may depend on
grooming. Wilkinson (1986) found that grooming fre-
quency correlates positively with blood-sharing frequency.
However, grooming may also allow the bats to assess
whether an individual has recently fed, to determine the
likelihood of receiving a regurgitated meal (Wilkinson
1986).
Studies of captive monkeys show that some species may
trade food for other currencies. In one experiment with
captive tufted capuchins, subjects in one group transferred
stones to subjects in a second group, who used the stones
as tools to access food (Westergaard & Suomi 1997).
Subjects in the second group then transferred food to
subjects in the first group. Despite the appearance of
trading tools for food, food transfer occurred at a similar
rate whether or not tools were needed, indicating that
trade did not explain sharing. de Waal & Berger (2000)
demonstrated trade in captive capuchins, suggesting that
food owners that received help in a cooperative task
tended to share food more frequently. In a study with
captive spider monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi, the frequency of
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dyadic grooming correlated positively with cofeeding at
a monopolizable feeder, suggesting that grooming influ-
enced tolerance at the feeding site (Pastor-Nieto 2001).
In a study with captive chimpanzees, food possessors
tolerated frequent grooming partners more often, allow-
ing them to passively acquire food (Koyama & Dunbar
1996). In another study, individual A shared more fre-
quently with B if B had groomed A earlier in the day, but
not after A had groomed B (de Waal 1989, 1997a). After
food-sharing trials, possessors groomed individuals with
whom they had shared less frequently than those with
whom they had not shared (de Waal 1997a). This supplies
the strongest evidence that chimpanzees may trade food
for grooming, because the temporal pattern of taking
turns exchanging grooming and food prevents one
individual from gaining all of the benefits (de Waal 1989).
Some studies of wild chimpanzees also support the idea
of trade. Nishida et al. (1992) showed that the frequency
with which chimpanzees obtain meat from the alpha
male correlates positively with the total amount of time
they spend grooming with the alpha. Additionally, the
alpha male tends to support those males with whom he
has frequently shared meat during their dominance con-
flicts with other males. The authors concluded that
chimpanzees use meat sharing to maintain coalitions,
with the alpha male effectively trading meat for grooming
and dominance support. While suggestive, this study does
not rule out symmetry-based reciprocity, because an index
of proximity correlated positively with the frequency with
which individuals obtained meat from the alpha male.
Others also argue that chimpanzees use meat as a social
or political tool to build coalitionary support (Mitani &
Watts 2001) and to ‘reward allies and snub rivals’
(Stanford 1998, 1999). Several researchers have suggested
that chimpanzees hunt to provide highly prized items to
trade (Stanford et al. 1994; Mitani & Watts 2001). These
authors, however, have provided no data concerning the
opportunity to receive meat. Perhaps only grooming
partners or allies attempt to get meat from a possessor,
and possessors share meat because of other mechanisms,
such as harassment.
Show-off/status enhancement
Food sharing may serve as a costly display that adver-
tises an animal’s social status. For example, meat is energe-
tically costly and risky for chimpanzees to acquire (Boesch
1994), so sharing with others may advertise an individu-
al’s strength and health. Such a signal may intimidate
rivals or attract mates. When seen begging, an individual
appears weak, in essence giving up a unit of social status
for a nutritional benefit (Moore 1984). Also, simply pos-
sessing a desirable food item may draw positive attention
to an individual (Teleki 1973; Rijksen 1978), thus raising
its social status.
As with the other cognitively complex hypotheses, the
status enhancement hypothesis proves difficult to test.
Proper assessment of the status enhancement hypothesis
requires a long-term study that tracks both an individual’s
changes in social status and sharing patterns (de Waal
1989). Apart from anecdotes (Boesch & Boesch 1989),
little evidence supports meat sharing to enhance status
in chimpanzees (de Waal 1989); however, some support
comes from work with Arabian babblers, Turdoides
squamiceps. These birds maintain a strict dominance
hierarchy, in which dominant individuals feed insects to
subordinates. Adults appear to compete to feed each other,
and interfere when subordinates try to feed others (Zahavi
1990). When fed by a subordinate, a dominant male
usually responds with aggression. Typically, the alpha
male seeks out and feeds the beta male. Zahavi interpreted
this sharing as a display, and the acceptance of food
decreases the social status of the recipient.
Group augmentation
The cooperative breeding literature first introduced
the concept of group augmentation (Woolfenden &
Fitzpatrick 1978; Brown 1980; Wiley & Rabenold 1984;
Brown 1987), although Kropotkin (1908) and Trivers
(1971) alluded to these ideas earlier. By aiding unrelated
individuals, a helper increases the group size, which may
provide some future benefit (e.g. group territory defence
in lions: Grinnell et al. 1995; Heinsohn & Packer 1995).
Because the cooperator gains future benefits, this type of
delayed mutualism resists cheaters; cheaters have smaller
group sizes and therefore reduced future fitness (Kokko
et al. 2001; Packer et al. 2001; Clutton-Brock 2002).
Lima (1989) modelled a similar situation of this ‘mutual
dependence’ in which an individual’s fitness depends on
the presence of another group member, which in turn,
depends on the actions of the individual. If an individual
defects in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, its partner will
probably not survive to the next round. If the probability
of finding another partner is low, the defector could face
a much higher predation risk as a singleton. Therefore, by
cooperating, an individual increases its group size and
reduces the future risk of predation.
Most examples of group augmentation still come from
the cooperative breeding literature (reviewed in Clutton-
Brock 2002). Although helping in cooperative breeders
frequently involves group territory defence, predator
vigilance and babysitting, offspring provisioning plays
a large role. Often the helpers are closely related to the
offspring but not always (Stacey & Koenig 1990; Cockburn
1998). Because of the frequency of helping unrelated
offspring in meerkats, Suricata suricatta, Clutton-Brock and
colleagues proposed group augmentation as a possible
explanation for such cooperativeness. Helping increases
pup growth and survival, thereby increasing group size
(Clutton-Brock et al. 2001). Large group sizes offer direct
benefits to helpers such as lower predation risk (Clutton-
Brock et al. 1999) and a pool of potential helpers when the
current helpers begin to breed (Brotherton et al. 2001).
A similar increase in offspring number and adult survival
associated with larger group size occurs in dwarf mon-
gooses, Helogale parvula (Rood 1990).
Wilkinson (1992) suggested that communal nursing in
evening bats, Nycticeius humeralis, may increase colony
size and reduce predation risk. However, this ‘milk
dumping’ could also have the immediate effect of re-
ducing weight and decreasing energetic costs for foraging
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(Roulin 2002). Extreme forms of group augmentation may
include adopting or even kidnapping (and therefore pro-
visioning) unrelated offspring to increase their group size
(Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1984; Zahavi 1990; Heinsohn
1991), possibly to ensure the presence of helpers when
they breed (Connor & Curry 1995).
DISCUSSION
This framework implies the important theoretical point
that all of these explanations are not equally likely among
animal species. The nature of delayed and exchanged bene-
fits requires specialized adaptations, limiting the number of
species that can reap these types of benefits.
Limitations of Hypotheses
The framework presented here indicates that a complete
study of food sharing requires synthesizing the current
functional explanations with potential cognitive mecha-
nisms. Therefore, evaluating the underlying psychological
constraints on animals can provide important insights
into the applicability of certain hypotheses. Given that
not all hypotheses will apply to all species, we can
consider specific limitations for each hypothesis.
Increased foraging, predation avoidance
and group augmentation
All three of these hypotheses share the following result:
sharing food increases group size, which in turn, increases
individual fitness. The benefits of membership in a group
have been well documented (Bertram 1978; Rubenstein
1982; Packer & Ruttan 1988; Krause & Ruxton 2002);
therefore, sharing to increase group size can be quite com-
mon among group-living species. We should not, howev-
er, expect these hypotheses to explain sharing in solitary
or pair-bonded species. In addition, these types of sharing
may be limited to large, shareable resources (Hauser &
Wrangham 1987; Hauser et al. 1993). Elgar’s (1986) study
emphasizes this point by showing that house sparrows
recruit others to a divisible/shareable pile of bread crumbs
more often than to a solid/nonshareable piece of bread
equivalent in mass. These rather minor restrictions in-
dicate that the ‘increase group size’ hypotheses could
explain many instances of sharing, but chiefly in social,
cooperatively breeding, or predatory birds and mammals.
Mate provisioning
The distinction between precopulatory and postcopula-
tory mate provisioning is an important one. Precopulatory
provisioning probably occurs most often in species with
strong intersexual selection; females can then use the pro-
visioned food as a signal of the male’s fitness. Provisioning
following copulation benefits monogamous species in
which parental investment is crucial. Therefore, mate pro-
visioning could be quite common given the benefit to both
promiscuous andmonogamous species.Nevertheless, it has
been described mostly in insects, birds, cooperatively
breeding mammals (Mech et al. 1999), and chimpanzees.
Harassment
Harassment has very few constraints. Two complete
strangers can find themselves in a situation in which
harassment can elicit sharing. Simple instrumental learn-
ing of aversive stimuli (Thorndike 1911; Skinner 1938)
can condition animals to avoid harassment. How wide-
spread is harassment? Primates have been the focus of
most sharing studies, and harassment appears to be ubi-
quitous among them, occurring in titi monkeys, squirrel
monkeys, capuchins, macaques, gibbons, bonobos and
chimpanzees. Harassment also occurs in several bird
species (Amat 2000) but is often referred to as ‘scrounging’
(Barnard & Sibly 1981; Giraldeau & Caraco 2000; Ha et al.
2003). Harassment and begging are almost universal
across taxa that feed altricial offspring (reviewed in Kilner
& Johnstone 1997). Extreme forms of harassment such as
kleptoparasitism or food stealing may extend beyond
sharing, but they are very common types of food inter-
actions (Brockmann & Barnard 1979; Furness 1987;
Durant 2000).
Reciprocity and trade
Timing of benefits could limit reciprocity and trade as
general explanations of cooperation because discounting
can devalue future reciprocated acts (May 1981). Studies
on humans and nonhuman animals verify the effect of
discounting on cooperation (Green et al. 1995; Baker &
Rachlin 2002; Harris & Madden 2002; Stephens et al.
2002). Trivers (1971) emphasized the importance of
timing in his original model:
The time lag is the crucial factor, for it means that only under
highly specialized circumstances can the altruist be reasonably
guaranteed that the causal chain he initiates with his altruistic
act will eventually return to him and confer, directly or
indirectly, its benefit (Trivers 1971, page 39).
Reciprocity theory must account for discounting of future
benefits. In addition to requiring multiple interactions
and individual recognition, reciprocity requires a low dis-
counting rate and complex cognitive skills to track debts
owed and favours given. In addition, trade requires the abi-
lity to exchange between two or more fitness currencies.
How animals value and compare different types of bene-
fits is poorly understood. Humans and some other species
of primates may possess the skills necessary to recipro-
cate and trade (Kaplan & Hill 1985; Winterhalder 1996a;
Bliege Bird & Bird 1997; Brosnan & de Waal 2002; Hauser
et al. 2003), but these explanations probably do not
account for cooperative behaviour in most nonhuman
animals.
Status enhancement
The status enhancement hypothesis suffers from the
previously mentioned problems of deferred benefits. The
cumulative nature of increasing status requires a delay
before benefits are realized. This should involve discount-
ing of the sharer’s return benefit, as well as memory
constraints for other group members (status is, after all,
relative to others). However, other types of investment in
status (such as ritualized displays or contests) also delay
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the return benefit and are quite common. It appears as
though some animals use specialized techniques to assess
status (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990), so the delayed benefits
are not discounted heavily. Despite the ubiquity of
dominance hierarchies and other status-assessing mecha-
nisms, evidence of using food sharing to raise status is
restricted to only a few species such as babblers, ravens
(Heinrich & Marzluff 1991) and chimpanzees.
Future Directions
Historically, research on sharing and cooperation has
primarily focused on explanations involving delayed
benefits. In particular, many theoretical studies have
investigated the role of reciprocity in the evolution of
cooperation (reviewed in Dugatkin 1997); however, aside
from the examples reviewed here, little empirical support
exists for reciprocity in nonhuman animals (Noe¨ 1990;
Connor 1995; Pusey & Packer 1997; Stephens et al. 1997).
We feel that more focus should be placed on simpler but
previously overlooked explanations such as by-product
mutualism, harassment and group augmentation. These
hypotheses can by no means explain all instances of
sharing, but their simplicity permits application to a broad
range of taxa and demands their elimination before
invoking more elaborate hypotheses.
Of course, multiple types of benefits can (and probably
often do) occur simultaneously to shape sharing behav-
iour. For example, blood sharing in vampire bats could be
an interaction between kin selection, reciprocity and trade
(Wilkinson 1984, 1986; Denault & McFarlane 1995). In
addition, simpler mechanisms could have initiated shar-
ing, allowing the evolution of more elaborate mechanisms
(e.g. food recruitment in ravens could initially have
increased individual foraging efficiency but was later co-
opted into a signal of status). Disentangling these inter-
actions can provide insight into the evolution and
maintenance of sharing behaviour.
Acknowledgments
We thank Esteban Ferna´ndez-Juricic, John Mitani, Craig
Packer, Anne Pusey, David Stephens, Michael Wilson and
two anonymous referees for helpful comments on the
manuscript.
References
Amat, J. A. 2000. Courtship feeding, food sharing, or tolerated theft
among paired red-crested pochards (Netta rufina)? Journal fu¨r
Ornithologie, 141, 327e334.
Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. 1981. The evolution of cooperation.
Science, 211, 1390e1396.
Baker, F. & Rachlin, H. 2002. Self-control by pigeons in the
prisoner’s dilemma. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 9, 482e488.
Barnard, C. J. & Sibly, R. M. 1981. Producers and scroungers:
a general model and its application to captive flocks of house
sparrows. Animal Behaviour, 29, 543e550.
Bertram, B. C. R. 1978. Living in groups: predators and prey.
In: Behavioural Ecology: an Evolutionary Approach. 1st edn (Ed.
by J. R. Krebs & N. B. Davies), pp. 64e96. Oxford: Blackwell
Scientific.
Bliege Bird, R. L. & Bird, D. W. 1997. Delayed reciprocity and
tolerated theft: the behavioral ecology of food-sharing strategies.
Current Anthropology, 38, 49e78.
Blurton Jones, N. G. 1984. A selfish origin for human food sharing:
tolerated theft. Ethology and Sociobiology, 5, 1e3.
Blurton Jones, N. G. 1986. Fitness returns from resources and the
outcome of contests: some implications for primatology and
anthropology. In: Primate Ontogeny, Cognition and Social Behavior
(Ed. by J. G. Else & P. C. Lee), pp. 393e406. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Blurton Jones, N. G. 1987. Tolerated theft, suggestions about the
ecology and evolution of sharing, hoarding and scrounging. Social
Science Information, 26, 31e54.
Boesch, C. 1994. Cooperative hunting in wild chimpanzees. Animal
Behaviour, 48, 653e667. doi: 10.1006/anbe.1994.1285.
Boesch, C. & Boesch, H. 1989. Hunting behavior of wild
chimpanzees in the Tai National Park. American Journal of Physical
Anthropology, 78, 547e573.
Boggs, C. L. 1995. Male nuptial gifts: phenotypic consequences and
evolutionary implications. In: Insect Reproduction (Ed. by S. R.
Leather & J. Hardie), pp. 215e242. New York: CRC Press.
Bolten, A. B., Robinson, F. A., Nation, J. L. & Yu, S. J. 1983. Food
sharing between honeybee (Apis mellifera) colonies in flight cages.
Journal of Apicultural Research, 22, 90e100.
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. 1992. Punishment allows the evolution
of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and
Sociobiology, 13, 171e195.
Brockmann, H. J. & Barnard, C. J. 1979. Kleptoparasitism in birds.
Animal Behaviour, 27, 487e514.
Brosnan, S. F. & de Waal, F. B. M. 2002. A proximate perspective
on reciprocal altruism. Human Nature, 13, 129e152.
Brotherton, P. N. M., Clutton-Brock, T. H., O’Riain, M. J., Gaynor,
D., Sharpe, L., Kansky, R. & McIlrath, G. M. 2001. Offspring
food allocation by parents and helpers in a cooperative mammal.
Behavioral Ecology, 12, 590e599.
Brown, C. R. & Brown, M. B. 1996. Coloniality in the Cliff Swallow:
the Effect of Group Size on Social Behavior. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Brown, C. R., Brown, M. B. & Shaffer, M. L. 1991. Food-sharing
signals among social foraging cliff swallows. Animal Behaviour, 42,
551e564.
Brown, J. L. 1980. Fitness in complex avian social systems. In:
Evolution of Social Behaviour: Hypotheses and Empirical Tests (Ed. by
H. Markl), pp. 115e128. Weinheim: Verlag Chemie.
Brown, J. L. 1983. Cooperation: a biologist’s dilemma. In: Advances
in the Study of Behaviour (Ed. by J. S. Rosenblatt), pp. 1e37.
New York: Academic Press.
Brown, J. L. 1987. Helping and Communal Breeding in Birds.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Caraco, T. & Brown, J. L. 1986. A game between communal
breeders: when is food sharing stable? Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 118, 379e393.
Cheney, D. L. & Seyfarth, R. M. 1990. How Monkeys See the World:
Inside the Mind of Another Species. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Clutton-Brock, T. H. 2002. Breeding together: kin selection and
mutualism in cooperative vertebrates. Science, 296, 69e72.
Clutton-Brock, T. H. & Parker, G. A. 1995a. Punishment in animal
societies. Nature, 373, 209e216.
Clutton-Brock, T. H. & Parker, G. A. 1995b. Sexual coercion in
animal societies. Animal Behaviour, 49, 1345e1365. doi: 10.1006/
anbe.1995.0166.
ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, 67, 4610
Clutton-Brock, T.H.,Gaynor,D.,McIlrath,G.M.,MacColl, A.D. C.,
Kansky, R., Chadwick, P., Manser, M. B., Skinner, J. D. &
Brotherton, P. N. M. 1999. Predation, group size and mortality in
a cooperative mongoose, Suricata suricatta. Journal of Animal
Ecology, 68, 672e683.
Clutton-Brock, T. H., Russell, A. F., Sharpe, L. L., Brotherton,
P. N. M., McIlrath, G. M., White, S. & Cameron, E. Z. 2001.
Effects of helpers on juvenile development and survival in
meerkats. Science, 293, 2446e2449.
Cockburn, A. 1998. Evolution of helping behavior in cooperatively
breeding birds. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 29,
141e177.
Connor, R. C. 1995. Altruism among non-relatives: alternatives to the
‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 10, 84e86.
Connor, R. C. & Curry, R. L. 1995. Helping non-relatives: a role
for deceit? Animal Behaviour, 49, 389e393. doi: 10.1006/anbe.
1995.0051.
Cooper, S. M. 1991. Optimal hunting groups size: the need for lions
to defend their kills against loss to spotted hyaenas. African Journal
of Ecology, 29, 130e136.
Denault, L. K. & McFarlane, D. A. 1995. Reciprocal altruism
between male vampire bats, Desmodus rotundus. Animal Behav-
iour, 49, 855e856.
Dittus, W. P. J. 1984. Toque macaque (Macaca sinica) food calls:
semantic communication concerning food distribution in the
environment. Animal Behaviour, 32, 470e477.
Dugatkin, L. A. 1997. Cooperation Among Animals: an Evolutionary
Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.
Durant, S. M. 2000. Living with the enemy: avoidance of hyenas
and lions by cheetahs in the Serengeti. Behavioral Ecology, 11,
624e632.
East, M. L. & Hofer, H. 1991. Loud calling in a female-dominated
mammalian society: I. Behavioural contexts and functions of
whooping of spotted hyaenas, Crocuta crocuta. Animal Behaviour,
42, 651e669.
Elgar, M. A. 1986. House sparrows establish foraging flocks by
giving chirrup calls if the resources are divisible. Animal Behaviour,
34, 169e174.
Evans, C. S. & Marler, P. 1994. Food calling and audience effects in
male chickens, Gallus gallus: their relationships to food availability,
courtship and social facilitation. Animal Behaviour, 47,
1159e1170. doi: 10.1006/anbe.1994.1154.
Feistner, A. T. C. & McGrew, W. C. 1989. Food-sharing in primates:
a critical review. In: Perspectives in Primate Biology (Ed. by P. K. Seth
& S. Seth), pp. 21e36. New Delhi: Today & Tomorrow.
Feistner, A. T. C. & Price, E. C. 1990. Food-sharing in cotton-top
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus). Folia Primatologica, 54, 34e45.
Ferrari, S. F. 1987. Food transfer in a wild marmoset group. Folia
Primatologica, 48, 203e206.
Fragaszy, D. M. & Mason, W. A. 1983. Comparisons of feeding
behavior in captive squirrel and titi monkeys (Saimiri sciureus and
Callicebusmoloch). Journal of Comparative Psychology,97,310e326.
Fruth, B. & Hohmann, G. 2002. How bonobos handle hunts and
harvests: why share food? In: Behavioural Diversity in Chimpanzees
and Bonobos (Ed. by C. Boesch, G. Hohmann & L. F. Marchant),
pp. 231e243. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Furness, R. W. 1987. Kleptoparasitism in seabirds. In: Seabirds:
Feeding Ecology and Role in Marine Ecosystems (Ed. by J. P. Croxall),
pp. 77e100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giraldeau, L.-A. & Caraco, T. 2000. Social Foraging Theory.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Gonza´lez-Solı´s, J., Sokolov, E. & Becker, P. H. 2001. Courtship
feedings, copulations and paternity in common terns, Sterna
hirundo. Animal Behaviour, 61, 1125e1132. doi: 10.1006/anbe.
2001.1711.
Goodall, J. 1986. The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Green, L., Price, P. C. & Hamburger, M. E. 1995. Prisoner’s
dilemma and the pigeon: control by immediate consequences.
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 64, 1e17.
Grinnell, J., Packer, C. & Pusey, A. E. 1995. Cooperation in male
lions: kinship, reciprocity or mutualism? Animal Behaviour, 49,
95e105.
Guinet, C., Barrett-Lennard, L. G. & Loyer, B. 2000. Co-ordinated
attack behavior and prey sharing by killer whales at Crozet
Archipelago: strategies for feeding on negatively-buoyant prey.
Marine Mammal Science, 16, 829e834.
Gurksy, S. 2000. Allocare in a nocturnal primate: data on the
spectral tarsier, Tarsius spectrum. Folia Primatologica, 71, 39e54.
Gwynne, D. T. 1982. Courtship feeding increases female reproduc-
tive success in bushcrickets. Nature, 307, 361e363.
Gwynne, D. T. 1986. Courtship feeding in katydids (Orthoptera:
Tettigoniidae): investment in offspring or in obtaining fertiliza-
tions? American Naturalist, 128, 342e352.
Gwynne, D. T. 1997. The evolution of edible ‘sperm sacs’ and other
forms of courtship feeding in crickets, katydids and their kin
(Orthoptera: Ensifera). In: The Evolution of Mating Systems in Insects
and Arachnids (Ed. by J. C. Choe & B. J. Crepi), pp. 110e129.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ha, R. R., Bentzen, P., Marsh, J. & Ha, J. C. 2003. Kinship and
association in social foraging northwestern crows (Corvus caur-
inus). Bird Behavior, 15, 64e75.
Hamilton, W. D. 1964. The genetical evolution of social behaviour.
I, II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1e52.
Harris, A. C. & Madden, G. J. 2002. Delay discounting and
performance on the prisoner’s dilemma game. Psychological
Record, 52, 429e440.
Hauser, M. D. 1992. Costs of deception: cheaters are punished in
rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., 89, 12137e12139.
Hauser, M. D. & Wrangham, R. W. 1987. Manipulation of food
calls in captive chimpanzees: a preliminary report. Folia Primato-
logica, 48, 207e210.
Hauser, M. D., Teixidor, P., Fields, L. & Flaherty, R. 1993. Food-
elicited calls in chimpanzees: effects of food quantity and
divisibility. Animal Behaviour, 45, 817e819. doi: 10.1006/anbe.
1993.1096.
Hauser, M. D., Chen, M. K., Chen, F. & Chuang, E. 2003. Give
unto others: genetically unrelated cotton-top tamarin monkeys
preferentially give food to those who altruistically give food back.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 270,
2363e2370.
Heinrich, B. 1988a. Winter foraging at carcasses by three sympatric
corvids, with emphasis on recruitment by ravens, Corvus corvax.
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 23, 141e156.
Heinrich, B. 1988b. Food sharing in the raven, Corvus corax. In:
The Ecology of Social Behavior (Ed. by C. N. Slobodchikoff),
pp. 285e311. San Diego: Academic Press.
Heinrich, B. 1989. Ravens in Winter. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Heinrich, B. & Marzluff, J. M. 1991. Do common ravens yell
because they want to attract others? Behavioral Ecology and
Sociobiology, 28, 13e22.
Heinrich, B. & Marzluff, J. M. 1995. Why ravens share. American
Scientist, 83, 342e349.
Heinsohn, R. G. 1991. Kidnapping and reciprocity in cooperatively
breeding white-winged choughs. Animal Behaviour, 41,
1097e1100.
Heinsohn, R. G. & Packer, C. 1995. Complex cooperative
strategies in group-territorial African lions. Science, 269,
1260e1262.
REVIEW 611
Hemelrijk, C. K., van Laere, G. J. & van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. 1992.
Sexual exchange relationships in captive chimpanzees? Behavioral
Ecology and Sociobiology, 30, 269e275.
Hemelrijk, C. K., Meier, C. & Martin, R. D. 1999. ‘Friendship’ for
fitness in chimpanzees? Animal Behaviour, 58, 1223e1229. doi:
10.1006/anbe.1999.1254.
Hoelzel, A. R. 1991. Killer whale predation on marine mammals at
Punta Norte, Argentina: food sharing, provisioning and foraging
strategy. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 29, 197e204.
Holekamp, K. E., Boydston, E. E. & Smale, L. 2000. Group travel in
social carnivores. In: On the Move: How and Why Animals Travel in
Groups (Ed. by S. Boinski & P. A. Garber), pp. 587e627. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, R. H. 1982. Food-sharing behavior in captive Amazon River
dolphins (Inia geoffrensis). Cetology, 43, 1e3.
Judd, T. M. & Sherman, P. W. 1996. Naked mole-rates recruit
colony mates to food sources. Animal Behaviour, 52, 957e969.
doi: 10.1006/anbe.1996.0244.
Kaplan, H. & Hill, K. 1985. Food sharing among Ache foragers: tests
of explanatory hypotheses. Current Anthropology, 26, 223e246.
Kavanagh, M. 1972. Food-sharing behaviour within a group of douc
monkeys (Pygathrix nemaeus nemaeus). Nature, 239, 406e407.
Kilner, R. & Johnstone, R. A. 1997. Begging the question: are
offspring solicitation behaviours signals of need? Trends in Ecology
and Evolution, 12, 11e15.
Kokko, H., Johnstone, R. A. & Clutton-Brock, T. H. 2001. The
evolution of cooperative breeding through group augmentation.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 268, 187e196.
Koyama, N. F. & Dunbar, R. I. M. 1996. Anticipation of conflict by
chimpanzees. Primates, 37, 79e86.
Krause, J. & Ruxton, G. D. 2002. Living in Groups. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kropotkin, P. 1908. Mutual Aid: a Factor of Evolution. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Kuroda, S. 1984. Interaction over food among pygmy chimpanzees.
In: The Pygmy Chimpanzee: Evolutionary Biology and Behavior (Ed.
by R. Sussman), pp. 301e324. New York: Plenum.
La Cerra, P. & Bingham, R. 1998. The adaptive nature of the human
neurocognitive architecture: an alternative model. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., 95, 11290e11294.
Lack, D. 1940. Courtship feeding in birds. Auk, 57, 169e178.
Lifjeld, J. T. & Slagsvold, T. 1986. The function of courtship feeding
during incubation in the pied flycatcher, Ficedula hypoleuca.
Animal Behaviour, 34, 1441e1453.
Lima, S. L. 1989. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma: an approach to evolu-
tionarily stable cooperation. American Naturalist, 134, 828e834.
Lima, S. L. & Dill, L. M. 1990. Behavioral decisions made under the
risk of predation: a review and prospectus. Canadian Journal of
Zoology, 68, 619e640.
Marzluff, J. M. & Heinrich, B. 1991. Foraging by common ravens in
the presence and absence of territory holders: an experimental
analysis of social foraging. Animal Behaviour, 42, 755e770.
May, R. M. 1981. The evolution of cooperation. Nature, 292,
291e292.
Mazur, J. E. 1987. An adjusting procedure for studying delayed
reinforcement. In: Quantitative Analyses of Behavior: the Effect of
Delay and of Intervening Events on Reinforcement Value (Ed. by M. L.
Commons, J. E. Mazur, J. A. Nevin & H. Rachlin), pp. 55e73.
Hillsdale, New Jersey: L. Erlbaum.
Mazur, J. E. 2000. Tradeoffs among delay, rate, and amount of
reinforcement. Behavioural Processes, 49, 1e10.
Mech, L. D., Wolf, P. C. & Packard, J. M. 1999. Regurgitative food
transfer among wild wolves. Canadian Journal of Zoology, 77,
1192e1195.
Mitani, J. C. & Watts, D. P. 1999. Demographic influences on the
hunting behavior of chimpanzees. American Journal of Physical
Anthropology, 109, 439e454.
Mitani, J. C. & Watts, D. P. 2001. Why do chimpanzees hunt and
share meat? Animal Behaviour, 61, 915e924. doi: 10.1006/
anbe.2000.1681.
Moore, D. J., Williams, T. D. & Morris, R. D. 2000. Mate
provisioning, nutritional requirements for egg production, and
primary reproductive effort of female common terns, Sterna
hirundo. Journal of Avian Biology, 31, 183e196.
Moore, J. 1984. The evolution of reciprocal sharing. Ethology and
Sociobiology, 5, 5e14.
Mougeot, F. 2000. Territorial intrusions and copulation patterns in
red kites, Milvus milvus, in relation to breeding density. Animal
Behaviour, 59, 633e642. doi: 10.1006/anbe.1999.1373.
Nettelbeck, A. R. 1998. Observations on food sharing in wild lar
gibbons (Hylobates lar). Folia Primatologica, 69, 386e391.
Newman, J. A. & Caraco, T. 1989. Co-operative and non-
co-operative bases of food-calling. Journal of Theoretical Biology,
141, 197e209.
Newton, I. 1979. Population Ecology of Raptors. London: T. & A. D.
Poyser.
Nisbet, I. C. T. 1973. Courtship feeding, egg size and breeding
success in common terns. Nature, 241, 141e142.
Nishida, T., Hasegawa, T., Hayaki, H., Takahata, Y. & Uehara, S.
1992. Meat-sharing as a coalition strategy by an alpha male
chimpanzee? In: Topics in Primatology (Ed. by T. Nishida,
W. C. McGrew, P. Marler, M. Pickford & F. B. M. de Waal),
pp. 159e174. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Nissen, H. W. & Crawford, M. P. 1936. A preliminary study of food-
sharing behaviour in young chimpanzees. Journal of Comparative
Psychology, 22, 383e419.
Noe¨, R. 1990. A veto game played by baboons: a challenge to the
use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a paradigm for reciprocity and
cooperation. Animal Behaviour, 39, 79e90.
Noe¨, R. & Hammerstein, P. 1994. Biological markets: supply
and demand determine the effect of partner choice in cooperation,
mutualism and mating. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 35,
1e11.
Noe¨, R. & Hammerstein, P. 1995. Biological markets. Trends in
Ecology and Evolution, 10, 336e339.
Noe¨, R., van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. & Hammerstein, P. 2001.
Economics in Nature: Social Dilemmas, Mate Choice and Biological
Markets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Packer, C. & Ruttan, L. 1988. The evolution of cooperative hunting.
American Naturalist, 132, 159e198.
Packer, C., Pusey, A. E. & Eberly, L. E. 2001. Egalitarianism in
female African lions. Science, 293, 690e693.
Parker, G. A. 1974. Assessment strategy and the evolution of
fighting behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47, 223e243.
Parker, P. G., Waite, T. A., Heinrich, B. & Marzluff, J. M. 1994.
Do common ravens share ephemeral food resources with kin?
DNA fingerprinting evidence. Animal Behaviour, 48, 1085e1093.
doi: 10.1006/anbe.1994.1342.
Pastor-Nieto, R. 2001. Grooming, kinship and co-feeding in captive
spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi). Zoo Biology, 20, 293e303.
Perry, S. & Rose, L. 1994. Begging and transfer of coati meat by
white-faced capuchin monkeys, Cebus capuchinus. Primates, 35,
409e415.
Pusey, A. E. & Packer, C. 1997. The ecology of relationships. In:
Behavioural Ecology: an Evolutionary Approach. 4th edn (Ed. by J. R.
Krebs & N. B. Davies), pp. 254e283. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
Rachlin, H. 2000. The Science of Self-Control. Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press.
ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, 67, 4612
Richner, H. & Heeb, P. 1995. Is the information center hypothesis
a flop? In: Advances in the Study of Behavior (Ed. by P. J. B. Slater, J.
S. Rosenblatt, C. T. Snowdon & M. Milinski), pp. 1e45. San
Diego: Academic Press.
Richner, H. & Heeb, P. 1996. Communal life: honest signaling and
the recruitment center hypothesis. Behavioral Ecology, 7, 115e118.
Rijksen, H. 1978. Hunting behavior in hominids: some ethologi-
cal aspects. In: Recent Advances in Primatology (Ed. by D. Chivers &
K. Joysey), pp. 499e502. London: Academic Press.
Rood, J. P. 1990. Group size, survival, reproduction, and routes to
breeding in dwarf mongooses. Animal Behaviour, 39, 566e572.
Roulin, A. 2002. Why do lactating females nurse alien offspring?
A review of hypotheses and empirical evidence. Animal Behaviour,
63, 201e208. doi: 10.1006/anbe.2001.1895.
Rubenstein, D. I. 1982. On predation, competition, and the
advantages of group living. Perspectives in Ethology, 3, 205e231.
Sakaluk, S. K. 1984. Male crickets feed females to ensure complete
sperm transfer. Science, 223, 609e610.
Schessler, T. & Nash, L. T. 1977. Food sharing among captive
gibbons (Hylobates lar). Primates, 18, 677e689.
Seyfarth, R. M. & Cheney, D. L. 1988. Empirical tests of reciprocity
theory: problems in assessment. Ethology and Sociobiology, 9,
181e187.
Skinner, B. F. 1938. The Behavior of Organisms: an Experimental
Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Stacey, P. B. & Koenig, W. D. 1990. Cooperative Breeding in Birds:
Long Term Studies of Ecology and Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Stanford, C. B. 1998. Chimpanzee and Red Colobus. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Stanford, C. B. 1999. The Hunting Apes: Meat Eating and the Origins
of Human Behavior. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Stanford, C. B., Wallis, J., Mpongo, E. & Goodall, J. 1994. Hunting
decisions in wild chimpanzees. Behaviour, 131, 1e18.
Starin, E. D. 1978. Food transfer by wild titi monkeys (Callicebus
torquatus torquatus). Folia Primatologica, 30, 145e151.
Stephens, D. W. & Krebs, J. R. 1986. Foraging Theory. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Stephens, D. W., Anderson, J. P. & Benson, K. E. 1997. On the spu-
rious occurrence of tit for tat in pairs of predator-approaching fish.
Animal Behaviour, 53, 113e131. doi: 10.1006/anbe.1996.0283.
Stephens, D. W., McLinn, C. M. & Stevens, J. R. 2002. Discounting
and reciprocity in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Science, 298,
2216e2218.
Stevens, J. R. 2004. The selfish nature of generosity: harassment and
food sharing in primates. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London,
Series B, 21, 451e456. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2003.2625.
Stevens, J. R. & Stephens, D. W. 2002. Food sharing: a model of
manipulation by harassment. Behavioral Ecology, 13, 393e400.
Strum, S. C. 1975. Primate predation: interim report on the
development of a tradition in a troop of olive baboons. Science,
187, 755e757.
Strum, S. C. 1981. Processes and products of change: baboon
predatory behavior in Gilgil, Kenya. In: Omnivorous Primates:
Gathering and Hunting in Human Evolution (Ed. by R. S. O. Harding
& G. Teleki), pp. 255e302. New York: Columbia University Press.
Takahata, Y., Hasegawa, T. & Nishida, T. 1984. Chimpanzee
predation in the Mahale Mountains from August 1979 to May
1982. International Journal of Primatology, 5, 213e233.
Tasker, C. R. & Mills, J. A. 1981. A functional analysis of courtship
feeding in the red-billed gull. Behaviour, 77, 222e241.
Teleki, G. 1973. The Predatory Behavior of Wild Chimpanzees.
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press.
Teleki, G. 1981. The omnivorous diet and eclectic feeding habits of
chimpanzees in Gombe National Park, Tanzania. In: Omnivorous
Primates. Gathering and Hunting in Human Evolution (Ed. by
R. S. O. Harding & G. Teleki), pp. 303e343. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Thiollay, J. M. 1991. Foraging home range use and social behaviour
of a group-living rainforest raptor, the red-throated caracara,
Daptrius americanus. Ibis, 133, 382e393.
Thorndike, E. L. 1911. Animal Intelligence. New York: Macmillan.
Thornhill, R. 1976. Sexual selection and parental investment in
insects. American Naturalist, 110, 153e163.
Trivers, R. L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly
Review of Biology, 46, 35e57.
Tutin, C. E. G. 1979. Mating patterns and reproductive strategies in
a community of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii).
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 6, 29e38.
Vahed, K. 1998. The function of nuptial feeding in insects: a review
of empirical studies. Biological Reviews, 73, 43e78.
de Waal, F. B. M. 1989. Food sharing and reciprocal obligations
among chimpanzees. Journal of Human Evolution, 18, 433e459.
de Waal, F. B. M. 1997a. The chimpanzee’s service economy: food
for grooming. Evolution and Human Behavior, 18, 375e386.
de Waal, F. B. M. 1997b. Food transfers through mesh in brown
capuchins. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 111, 370e378.
de Waal, F. B. M. 2000. Attitudinal reciprocity in food sharing
among brown capuchin monkeys. Animal Behaviour, 60,
253e261. doi: 10.1006/anbe.2000.1471.
de Waal, F. B. M. & Berger, M. L. 2000. Payment for labour in
monkeys. Nature, 404, 563.
de Waal, F. B. M. & Luttrell, L. M. 1988. Mechanisms of social
reciprocity in three primate species: symmetrical relationship cha-
racteristics or cognition? Ethology and Sociobiology, 9, 101e118.
de Waal, F. B. M., Luttrell, L. M. & Canfield, M. E. 1993.
Preliminary data on voluntary food sharing in brown capuchin
monkeys. American Journal of Primatology, 29, 73e78.
Ward, P. & Zahavi, A. 1973. The importance of certain assemblages
of birds as ‘information centers’ for food-finding. Ibis, 115,
517e534.
Watts, D. P. & Mitani, J. C. 2002. Hunting and meat sharing by
chimpanzees at Ngogo, Kibale National Park, Uganda. In: Behav-
ioural Diversity in Chimpanzees and Bonobos (Ed. by C. Boesch,
G. Hohmann & L. F. Marchant), pp. 244e255. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
West-Eberhard, M. J. 1975. The evolution of social behavior by kin
selection. Quarterly Review of Biology, 10, 1e33.
Westergaard, G. C. & Suomi, S. J. 1997. Transfer of tools and food
between groups of tufted capuchins (Cebus apella). American
Journal of Primatology, 43, 33e41.
Westergaard, G. C., Kuhn, H. E., Babitz, M. A. & Suomi, S. J. 1998.
Aimed throwing as a means of food transfer between tufted
capuchins (Cebus apella). International Journal of Primatology, 19,
123e131.
Wiley, R. H. & Rabenold, K. N. 1984. The evolution of cooperative
breeding by delayed reciprocity and queuing for favorable social
positions. Evolution, 38, 609e621.
Wilkinson, G. S. 1984. Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat.
Nature, 308, 181e184.
Wilkinson, G. S. 1986. Social grooming in the vampire bat,
Desmodus rotundus. Animal Behaviour, 34, 1880e1889.
Wilkinson, G. S. 1992. Communal nursing in the evening bat,
Nycticeius humeralis. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 31,
225e235.
Winterhalder,B.1996a.Social foragingand thebehavioral ecologyof
intragroup resource transfers. Evolutionary Anthropology, 5, 46e57.
REVIEW 613
Winterhalder, B. 1996b. A marginal model of tolerated theft.
Ethology and Sociobiology, 17, 37e53.
Woolfenden, G. E. & Fitzpatrick, J. W. 1978. The inheritance of
territory in group breeding birds. Bioscience, 28, 104e108.
Woolfenden, G. E. & Fitzpatrick, J. W. 1984. The Florida Scrub Jay:
Demography of a Cooperative-Breeding Bird. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Wrangham, R. W. 1975. The Behavioural Ecology of Chimpanzees in
Gombe National Park, Tanzania. Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge Univer-
sity.
Zahavi, A. 1990. Arabian babblers: the quest for social status in
a cooperative breeder. In: Cooperative Breeding in Birds: Long-term
Studies of Ecology and Behavior (Ed. by P. B. Stacey & W. D.
Koenig), pp. 103e130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, 67, 4614
